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Abstract
We study the problem of allocating a set of in-
divisible goods to multiple agents. Recent work
[Bouveret and Lang, 2011] focused on allocating
goods in a sequential way, and studied what is the
“best” sequence of agents to pick objects based
on utilitarian or egalitarian criterion. In this pa-
per, we propose a parallel elicitation-free protocol
for allocating indivisible goods. In every round
of the allocation process, some agents will be se-
lected (according to some policy) to report their
preferred objects among those that remain, and ev-
ery reported object will be allocated randomly to an
agent reporting it. Empirical comparison between
the parallel protocol (applying a simple selection
policy) and the sequential protocol (applying the
optimal sequence) reveals that our proposed proto-
col is promising. We also address strategical issues.
1 Introduction
How to allocate resources among multiple agents in an ef-
ficient, effective, and fair way is one of the most impor-
tant sustainability problems. Recently it has become an
emerging research topic in AI. Many centralized approaches
to allocating indivisible goods have been proposed (e.g., in
[Cramton et al., 2006]). In these approaches, agents are re-
quired to fully reveal their preferences to some central au-
thority (which computes the final allocation) and pay for the
resources allocated to them at some prices. However, there
are some drawbacks and limitations of these approaches:
• the elicitation process and the winner determination al-
gorithm can be very expensive;
• agents have to reveal their full preferences, which they
might be reluctant to do (sometimes an elicitation pro-
cess is unwelcome);
• in many real world situations (e.g., assign-
ing courses to students [Kalinowski et al., 2012;
Budish and Cantillon, 2012], and providing employ-
ment training opportunities to unemployed), resources
must be allocated free and monetary side payments
[Chevaleyre et al., 2010] are impossible or unwelcome.
So it is important to design a decentralized elicitation-free
protocol for allocating indivisible goods. [Brams et al., 2012]
adapted a cake-cutting protocol (a typical decentral-
ized approach for the allocation of divisible goods
[Chen et al., 2010]) to the allocation of indivisible goods.
However, the protocol is typically designed for the cases
when there are only two agents. [Bouveret and Lang, 2011]
studied a sequential elicitation-free protocol. By applying
this protocol, any number of objects can be allocated to any
number of agents. The sequential protocol is parameterized
by a sequential policy (i.e., a sequence of agents). Agents
take turns to pick objects according to the sequence when the
allocation process begins.
In this paper, we define and study a parallel elicitation-free
protocol for allocating indivisible goods to multiple agents.
According to this protocol, a parallel policy (i.e., an agent se-
lection policy) has to be defined before the public allocation
process can begin. At each stage of the allocation process,
some agents will be selected (according to the parallel policy)
to publicly report their preferred objects among those that re-
main, and every reported object will be allocated to an agent
reporting it. If an object is reported by more than one agent,
then the agents reporting it draw lots and the winner could
get it. We give a general definition of parallel policies, which
can consider the allocation history that had happened; and
provide eight different criteria to measure the social welfare
induced by parallel policies.
In fact, any sequential policy applied in the sequential pro-
tocol is in a specific class of parallel policies that are sen-
sitive to identities. The social welfare criteria considered in
[Bouveret and Lang, 2011] and [Kalinowski et al., 2012] are
three of the eight criteria proposed in our paper. We intro-
duce two simple parallel policies (i.e., ̟A and ̟L), which
are insensitive to identities; and compare ̟A and the optimal
sequential policies (for small numbers of objects and agents)
with respect to the three social welfare criteria. The results
show that the parallel protocol is promising because ̟A out-
performs the optimal sequential policies in most cases.
We further consider strategical issues under ̟A. We show
that an agent who knows the preferences of other agents can
find in polynomial time whether she has a strategy for getting
a given set of objects regardless of uncertainty arising from
lottery. We also show that if the scoring function of the ma-
nipulator is lexicographic, computing an optimal strategy in
the sense of pessimism is polynomial.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sec-
tion 2 briefly reviews the basics of the sequential protocol.
Section 3 presents the parallel protocol and introduces the
two specific parallel policies (i.e., ̟A and ̟L). Section 4
compares ̟A and sequential policies with respect to several
social welfare criteria. Section 5 considers strategical issues
under ̟A. Section 6 summarizes the contributions of this
work and discusses future work.
2 Preliminaries
A set of m indivisible objects O = {o1, . . . , om} need to be
allocated free to a set of n agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. It is
supposed that m ≥ n and all agents have strict preferences.
≻i denotes agent i’s ordinal preference (which is a total strict
order) over O, and ranki(o) ∈ {1, . . . ,m} denotes the rank
of object o in ≻i. A profile R consists of a collection of rank-
ings, one for each agent: R = 〈≻1, . . . ,≻n〉; Prof(O,N )
denotes the set of possible profiles underO andN . In the fol-
lowing discussion, if not specified, we only consider full in-
dependence case, where all preference orderings are equally
probable (i.e., Pr(R) = 1(m!)n for every R ∈ Prof(O,N )).
Agent i’s value function ui : 2O → R specifies her val-
uation ui(B) on each bundle B with ui(∅) = 0. When
B = {o}, we also write ui(B) as ui(o). For any i ∈ N ,
B ⊆ 2O, and o ∈ O, it is assumed that:
• ui is additive, i.e., ui(B) =
∑
o′∈B u(o
′); and
• ui(o) = g(ranki(o)), where g is a non-increasing func-
tion from {1, . . . ,m} to R+.
g is called the scoring function. g is convex if g(x) − g(x +
1) ≥ g(y)− g(y + 1) holds for any x ≤ y. In this paper, we
focus on two prototypical convex scoring functions (let k ∈
{1, . . . ,m}): (Borda) gB(k) = m−k+1, and (lexicographic)
gL(k) = 2
m−k
.
In the sequential protocol, agents take turns to pick objects
according to a sequential policy π ∈ Nm. π(i) denotes the
ith agent designated by π. Given π and a profile R = 〈≻1
, . . . ,≻n〉, if all the agents act truthfully, then the correspond-
ing allocation history hπR is 〈π(1), o′1〉, . . . , 〈π(m), o′m〉 (i.e.,
agent π(k) picks object o′k at time k), where o′k ∈ O\{o′l|1 ≤
l < k} and o′k ≻π(k) o for every o ∈ O \ {o′l|1 ≤ l ≤ k}.
Given a scoring function g, agent i’s utility at π and R (i.e.,
ui(π,R)) and i’s expected utility at π (i.e., u∗i (π)) are:
ui(π,R) =
∑
o∈Oi
g(ranki(o))
where Oi = {o′k|1 ≤ k ≤ m s.t. π(k) = i}, and
u∗i (π) =
∑
R∈Prof(O,N ) ui(π,R)
(m!)n
Given an aggregation function F (which is a symmetric,
non-decreasing function from (R+)n to R+), the expected
social welfare of a sequential policy π is defined as:
sw∗F (π) = F (u
∗
1(π), . . . , u
∗
n(π)).
Sequential policy π is optimal for 〈O,N , g, F 〉 if sw∗F (π) ≥
sw∗F (π
′) for every π′ ∈ Nm.
[Bouveret and Lang, 2011] considered two typical aggre-
gation functions which correspond to the utilitarian criterion
Fu(u1, . . . , un) =
∑n
i=1 ui and the Rawlsian egalitarian cri-
terion Fe(u1, . . . , un) = min{ui|1 ≤ i ≤ n}. They also
showed that, strict alternation (i.e., 12 . . . n12 . . . n . . .) is op-
timal for 〈O,N , gB , Fu〉 when m ≤ 12 and n = 2, and
m ≤ 10 and n = 3. But they did not know whether this
is true for every m and n.
The following example is modified from the one given in
[Bouveret and Lang, 2011]. It illustrates the notions intro-
duced in this section and will be used throughout the paper.
Example 1 Let m = 5, n = 3, and π = 12332.
Then 〈u∗1(π), u∗2(π), u∗3(π)〉 is 〈5, 7.2, 7.5〉 under gB , and
〈16, 17.8667, 17〉 under gL. Consequently, sw∗Fu(π) = 19.7 un-
der gB , sw∗Fe(π) = 16 under gL, etc.
Suppose R = 〈≻1,≻2,≻3〉 s.t. ≻1= o1 ≻ o2 ≻
o3 ≻ o4 ≻ o5, ≻2= o4 ≻ o2 ≻ o5 ≻ o1 ≻ o3,
and ≻3= o1 ≻ o3 ≻ o5 ≻ o4 ≻ o2. Then hpiR =
〈1, o1〉〈2, o4〉〈3, o3〉〈3, o5〉〈2, o2〉. 〈u1(π,R), u2(π,R), u3(π,R)〉
is 〈5, 9, 7〉 under gB , and 〈16, 24, 12〉 under gL.
3 Parallel Protocol and Policies
Now we introduce a parallel protocol for allocating indivisi-
ble goods. At each stage t of the allocating process, there is
a designated set of agents Nt ⊆ N s.t. each i ∈ Nt reports
an object (her preferred object among those that remain). If
object o is reported by only one agent then it is allocated to
the agent, otherwise the agents demanding o draw lots 1 for
the right to get o.
The protocol is parameterized by a parallel policy. For-
mally, a parallel policy is a function ̟ : (2N × 2N )∗ →
2N . Given a finite sequence σ = 〈N1,N ′1〉, . . . , 〈Nk,N ′k〉
(where for every 1 ≤ l ≤ k, Nl is the set of agents reporting
at stage l, andN ′l ⊂ Nl is the set of agents losing some lottery
at stage l), ̟ designates the set of agents reporting at stage
k + 1. An allocation history induced by ̟ is in the form of
〈O1, D1〉N ′1〈O2, D2〉N
′
2 . . . 〈Op, Dp〉N
′
p STOP, where (sup-
pose 1 ≤ k ≤ p, and 1 ≤ l < p):
• O1 = O, N1 = ̟(ǫ)
2;
• Dk : Nk → Ok, O′k = {o ∈ Ok|∃i ∈ Nk.Dk(i) = o},
N ′k ⊂ Nk s.t. ∀o ∈ O
′
k|{i ∈ Nk \N
′
k|Dk(i) = o}| = 1;
• Ol+1 = Ol \ O′l, Nl+1 = ̟(〈N1,N
′
1〉, . . . , 〈Nl,N
′
l 〉);
• Ok 6= ∅, ∅ ⊂ Nk ⊆ N , and Op = O′p.
Intuitively, at stage k, Ok is the set of objects remaining, O′k
is the set of objects reported by some i ∈ Nk, and for every
i ∈ Nk, Dk(i) is the object reported by i. 〈Ok, Dk〉 is called
the demand situation at k, and STOP is called the termination
situation.
Given a parallel policy ̟ and a profile R = 〈≻1, . . . ,≻n〉,
if all the agents act truthfully, the set of possible histories can
be represented as an allocation structure S̟R = 〈V , E〉 s.t. V
and E are the minimal sets satisfying the following rules:
1We suppose the lot is fair, i.e., if there are k agents drawing lots
then each one of these agents has 1/k chance of winning the lot.
2ǫ denotes the empty sequence.
• 〈O, D : ̟(ǫ) → O〉 ∈ V s.t. ranki(D(i)) = 1 for
every i ∈ ̟(ǫ);
• if there exists a history h = . . . 〈Ok, Dk〉N ′k
〈Ok+1, Dk+1〉 . . . induced by ̟ such that:
– 〈Ok, Dk〉 ∈ V , and
– ∀i ∈ Nk+1∀o ∈ Ok+1 \ {Dk+1(i)}.Dk+1(i) ≻i o,
then 〈〈Ok, Dk〉,N ′k, 〈Ok+1, Dk+1〉〉 ∈ E , and
〈Ok+1, Dk+1〉 ∈ V ;
• STOP ∈ V , and if there exists a history h =
. . . 〈Ok, Dk〉N ′k STOP induced by ̟ s.t. 〈Ok, Dk〉 ∈ V
then 〈〈Ok, Dk〉,N ′k, STOP〉 ∈ E .
It is easy to find that S̟R is acyclic, and 〈O, D〉 is the root.
Since the allocation process from some demand situation
v ∈ V is nondeterministic in general, each rational agent i is
often concerned with her expected utility uˆi(v) and the min-
imal utility ui(v) that she can get regardless of uncertainty.
Formally, given a scoring function g, uˆi(v) = ui(v) = 0 if
v = STOP; otherwise (suppose v = 〈O′, D′ : N ′ → O′〉):
uˆi(v) = w +
∑
v′∈V #E
v
v′ · uˆi(v
′)
#outv
ui(v) = min{ui(N
′′, v′)|〈v,N ′′, v′〉 ∈ E}, where
• w = g(ranki(D
′(i)))
|{j∈N ′|D′(j)=D′(i)}| if i ∈ N
′
, w = 0 otherwise;
• #Evv′ = |{N
′′ ⊂ N|〈v,N ′′, v′〉 ∈ E}|;
• #outv = |{〈N ′′, v′〉 ∈ 2N × V|〈v,N ′′, v′〉 ∈ E}|;
• ui(N ′′, v′) = ui(v′) if i ∈ N ′′∪(N\N ′), ui(N ′′, v′) =
ui(v
′) + g(ranki(D
′(i))) otherwise.
uˆi(̟,R) = uˆi(v) and ui(̟,R) = ui(v) are called agent i’s
expected utility and minimum utility at̟ andR, respectively,
where v is the root of S̟R .
Each agent i ∈ N can evaluate a given parallel policy ̟
according to 4 values, i.e., vi(y, z,̟) where:
• y, z ∈ {u,e},
• vi(u, z,̟) =
∑
R∈Prof(O,N) ui(z,̟,R)
(m!)n ,
• vi(e, z,̟) = min{ui(z,̟,R)|R ∈ Prof(O,N )},
• ui(u, ̟,R) = uˆi(̟,R), and ui(e, ̟,R) = ui(̟,R).
The social welfare induced by ̟ (i.e., sw(x, y, z,̟))
can be measured by the 8 possible orderings over 3 el-
ements taken from {u,e}. Formally, x, y, z ∈ {u,e},
sw(u, y, z,̟) =
∑n
i=1 vi(y, z,̟), and sw(e, y, z,̟) =
min{vi(y, z,̟)|1 ≤ i ≤ n}
3
.
Any sequential policy π can be seen as a parallel policy
̟π s.t. ̟π(ǫ) = π(1) and ̟π(σk) = π(k + 1) for every
1 ≤ k < m, where σk = 〈{π(1)}, ∅〉, . . . , 〈{π(k)}, ∅〉. For
every profile R, there is only one possible history in S̟piR . So
uˆi(̟π, R) = ui(̟π, R) = ui(π,R), vi(u, z,̟π) = u∗i (π),
and sw(x, u,u, ̟π) = sw∗Fx(π).
In this paper, we introduce two specific parallel policies:
all–reporting ̟A, where all the agents report at every stage,
3Intuitively, u and e denote the utilitarian principle and the egal-
itarian principle in social welfare aggregation, respectively.
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Figure 1: Allocation structures of ̟A and ̟L
and loser–reporting ̟L, where all the agents losing some
lot at the current stage report at the next stage. Formally,
̟A(σ) = N for any sequence σ; ̟L(ǫ) = N , and
̟L(. . . , 〈Nk,N
′
k〉) =
{
N ′k if N ′k 6= ∅
N otherwise
̟L guarantees that every agent can get mn objects at least. So
in the eyes of pessimists, it may be a better choice than ̟A.
Note that neither ̟A nor̟L mentions identities of agents.
We called this kind of parallel policies are insensitive to iden-
tities. We can get Lemma 1 directly.
Lemma 1 Let parallel policy ̟ be insensitive to identi-
ties. Then for every y, z ∈ {u,e}, and i, j ∈ N , we
have vi(y, z,̟) = vj(y, z,̟), and sw(u, y, z,̟) = n ·
vi(y, z,̟) = n · sw(e, y, z,̟).
Example 2 Consider the situation depicted in Example 1. Figure
1 shows the allocation structures of ̟A and ̟L, where (let 1 ≤
p ≤ 3, 1 ≤ q ≤ 5, and ud denote the undefined value):
• vp = 〈Op, Dp : N → Op〉, v
′
q = 〈O
′
q , D
′
q : N
′
q → O
′
q〉;
• O1 = O
′
1 = O, O2 = O
′
2 = O
′
3 = {2, 3, 5}, O3 = {5},
O′4 = {3, 5}, and O′5 = {2, 5};
• N ′1 = N
′
4 = N
′
5 = N , N
′
2 = {1}, and N ′3 = {3};
• dp ∈ (Op)
|N| s.t. dp[i] = Dp(i) for every i ∈ N , i.e., d1 =
〈1, 4, 1〉, d2 = 〈2, 2, 3〉, and d3 = 〈5, 5, 5〉; and
• d′q ∈ (O
′
q ∪ {ud})|N| s.t. d′q[i] = D′q(i) if i ∈ N ′q , otherwise
d′q[i] = ud, i.e., d′1 = 〈1, 4, 1〉, d′2 = 〈2, nd, nd〉, d′3 =
〈nd, nd, 3〉, d′4 = 〈3, 5, 3〉, and d′5 = 〈2, 2, 5〉.
Under gB , 〈uˆ1(̟A, R), uˆ2(̟A, R), uˆ3(̟A, R)〉 = 〈4.8333, 8,
7.5〉, and sw(u,u,u,̟A) = 20.382, etc. Under gL, 〈u1(̟L, R),
u2(̟L, R), u3(̟L, R)〉 = 〈8, 16, 12〉, and sw(e,e,e,̟L) = 4.
4 Comparison
[Bouveret and Lang, 2011] studied what are the sequential
policies maximizing social welfare. They considered a util-
itarian principle and an egalitarian principle, in which the
social welfare induced by a sequential policy π is measured
Table 1: π∗, sw(u, u, u, ̟π∗), and sw(u, u, u, ̟A) under gB
n = 2 n = 3 n = 4
m π∗ swpi∗ swA π
∗ swpi∗ swA π
∗ swpi∗ swA
4 22 12.292 12.292 31 13.083 13.297 4 13.583 13.885
5 221 18.625 18.625 32 20.033 20.382 41 20.800 21.351
6 222 26.396 26.396 33 28.622 28.840 42 29.600 30.377
7 2221 35.396 35.396 331 38.511 38.864
8 2222 45.820 45.820 332 49.936 50.381
9 22221 57.487 57.487
10 22222 70.569 70.569
Table 2: π∗, sw(u, u, u, ̟π∗), and sw(u, u, u, ̟A) under gL
n = 2 n = 3 n = 4
m π∗ swpi∗ swA π
∗ swpi∗ swA π
∗ swpi∗ swA
4 22 20.458 20.458 31 23.000 23.460 4 24.417 25.458
5 221 44.725 44.725 32 51.933 53.028 41 56.350 58.477
6 222 95.371 95.371 33 114.27 115.63 42 125.26 129.80
7 2221 199.49 199.49 331 244.64 247.13
8 2222 412.91 412.91 332 516.09 520.79
9 22221 847.64 847.64
10 22222 1731.0 1731.0
by the values of sw(u,u,u, ̟π) and sw(e,u,u, ̟π), respec-
tively. They computed the optimal sequential policies for
small numbers of objects and agents using an exhaustive
search algorithm, and further conjectured that the problem of
finding an optimal sequential policy is NP-hard. It has been
proved that the alternating policy (i.e., 1212 . . .) maximizes
the value of sw(u,u,u, ̟π) for two agents under Borda scor-
ing function [Kalinowski et al., 2013a]. However, the gen-
eral problem (i.e., finding a sequential policy maximizing the
value of sw(u,u,u, ̟π) and sw(e,u,u, ̟π), for more than
two agents, or under other scoring functions) is still open.
On another hand, parallel policy ̟A (i.e., all–reporting)
is very natural and simple, and does not have costly proce-
dures like finding optimal sequence in sequential protocol.
By applying ̟A, every agent has a chance to get a remain-
ing object in every round of the parallel allocation process.
But we don’t know if sw(u,u,u, ̟A) and sw(e,u,u, ̟A) can
be computed in polynomial time. We conjecture it’s much
harder than computing sw(u,u,u, ̟π) and sw(e,u,u, ̟π),
because complications arise not only from uncertainty over
profiles but from uncertainty over lots.
In this section, we will compare the parallel protocol (ap-
plying ̟A) and the sequential protocol (applying the optimal
sequential policies) with respect to several social welfare cri-
teria. We demonstrate experimentally that in most cases, ̟A
is better than sequential policies. To sum up, the parallel pro-
tocol is promising.
We first compare ̟A and sequential policies with respect
to the utilitarian criterion considered by Bouveret and Lang,
which are sw(u,u,u, ̟A) and sw(u,u,u, ̟π), respectively.
For small numbers of objects and agents (i.e., m and n),
we compute the optimal sequential policies (denoted by π∗)
and sw(u,u,u, ̟π∗) by use of the tool provided by Bouveret
and Lang (http:// recherche.noiraudes.net/en/sequences.php),
and compute sw(u,u,u, ̟A) by use of an exhaustive method
(on a PC Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3570K @3.4Ghz). The time
required to compute sw(u,u,u, ̟A) grows dramatically in
Table 3: π∗, sw(e, u, u, ̟π∗), and sw(e, u, u, ̟A) under gB
n = 2 n = 3 n = 4
m π∗ swpi∗ swA π
∗ swpi∗ swA π
∗ swpi∗ swA
4 221 6.000 6.146 33 3.750 4.432 4 2.500 3.471
5 1222 9.000 9.313 332 5.000 6.794 44 4.500 5.338
6 2221 13.125 13.198 3321 9.000 9.613 443 5.833 7.594
7 12222 17.333 17.698 32133 12.250 12.955
8 22212 22.725 22.910 11332232 15.000 16.794
9 122222 28.429 28.744
10 2212221 35.200 35.285
Table 4: π∗, sw(e, u, u, ̟π∗), and sw(e, u, u, ̟A) under gL
n = 2 n = 3 n = 4
m π∗ swpi∗ swA π
∗ swpi∗ swA π
∗ swpi∗ swA
4 221 10.000 10.229 33 7.000 7.820 4 3.750 6.365
5 222 21.667 22.363 332 16.000 17.676 44 12.400 14.619
6 2221 47.500 47.686 3321 36.533 38.543 443 29.333 32.450
7 2222 98.400 99.745 33213 80.229 82.377
8 22221 205.40 206.46 332132 168.14 173.60
9 222211 421.59 423.82
10 222212 862.79 865.50
the number n of agents and in the number m of objects.
We find that with n = 3 and m = 8 the computation of
sw(u,u,u, ̟A) requires about 8 minutes, but sw(u,u,u, ̟A)
can not be computed in 12 hours with n = 3 and m = 9. The
results under Borda and Lexicographic scoring functions (i.e.,
gB and gL) are shown in Table 1 and Table 24, respectively.
From Table 1 and Table 2, we can get that when n = 2 and
10 ≥ m ≥ 4, the values of π∗ and ̟A are equal; however,
when n > 2, the values of ̟A are strictly greater than those
of π∗. These results suggest that, for small numbers of agents
and objects, we could have a better utilitarian social welfare
if we apply ̟A rather than ̟π∗ . We conjecture that it is not
a coincidence, but we could not find a proof.
Conjecture 1 Under any convex scoring function g and
for any number m ≥ n of objects, sw(u, u, u, ̟π∗) =
sw(u, u, u, ̟A) when n = 2, and sw(u, u, u, ̟π∗) <
sw(u, u, u, ̟A) when n > 2.
We also compare ̟A and sequential policies with respect
to the egalitarian criterion considered by Bouveret and Lang.
The results under gB and gL are shown in Table 3 and Table 4,
respectively. We find that the values of ̟A are strictly greater
than those of π∗ in all the test cases. In fact, ̟A is insensitive
to identities. So according to Lemma 1, sw(e, u, u, ̟A) =
1/n · sw(u, u, u, ̟A), which is definitely the fairest way to
divide sw(u, u, u, ̟A). However, sequential policies are sen-
sitive to identities. From Conjecture 1, we further conjecture
that ̟A will always be a better choice than any sequential
policy for the balance of utilitarianism and egalitarianism.
Conjecture 2 Under any convex scoring function g, for any
number n of agents and any number m ≥ n of objects,
sw(e, u, u, ̟π∗) < sw(e, u, u, ̟A).
[Kalinowski et al., 2012] considered a different egalitarian
principle in which the social welfare induced by a sequential
4Note that in Tables 1 to 4, n, swpi∗ , and swA denote the se-
quence 12 . . . n, the social welfare induced by π∗ and ̟A.
Table 5: π∗, sw(u, e, u, ̟π∗), and sw(u, e, u, ̟A) under gB
when n = 2
m π∗ sw(u, e, u, ̟pi∗) sw(u, e, u,̟A)
2 12 1.500 1.750
3 122 3.000 3.500
4 1221 5.667 5.958
5 12122 8.483 8.992
6 121221 12.397 12.736
7 1212122 16.560 17.082
8 12122121 21.738 22.129
policy π is measured by the value of sw(u,e,u, ̟π). They
also computed the optimal sequential policies (denoted by
π∗) under gB when n = 2 and p ≤ 8. We compute the
values of sw(u, e, u, ̟π∗) and sw(u, e, u, ̟A) by use of an
exhaustive method. The result is shown in Table 5. Again,
̟A outperforms sequential policies in all the test cases.
5 Strategical Issues under ̟A
In this section, we will discuss strategical issues under all–
reporting policy ̟A, which is one of the simplest parallel
policies that are insensitive to identities. As most collective
decision mechanisms, ̟A is not strategyproof. See Example
2. If all the agents play sincerely, i.e., report their preferred
object at each stage, then uˆ1(̟A, R) = 12g(1) + 12g(2) +
1
3g(5) and u1(̟A, R) = 0. Suppose 1 is a pessimist and be-
lieves that she cannot win any lottery. Then she is concerned
only with the utility she can get regardless of uncertainty. If 1
knows other agents’ preferences and plays strategically, then
she reports o2 first and she can get g(2) units of utility at least,
which is better than 0 = u1(̟A, R).
Someone may want to study the impact of strategic be-
havior on the complete-information extensive-form game of
such parallel allocation procedures 5. However, it is sup-
posed that the environment matches decentralized elicitation-
free protocols’ application motivation. That is to say, we
suppose that it is hard to learn self-interested agents’ pref-
erences in advance 6. So we accept the assumption made in
[Bouveret and Lang, 2011], i.e., all agents but the only one
manipulator act truthfully. In the following discussion, with-
out loss of generality, let 1 be the manipulator that knows
the rankings of the other agents (i.e., 〈≻2, . . . ,≻n〉), and
o1 ≻1 o2 ≻1 . . . ≻1 om.
Under ̟A, a strategy for agent 1 is a sequence of objects
τ = o′1, . . . , o
′
T s.t. ∀t, t
′ ∈ {1, . . . , T } (o′t ∈ O and o′t =
o′t′ iff t = t′) holds. That is to say, τ specifies which object 1
should report at any stage 1 ≤ t ≤ T . Some strategies may
fail because some object that 1 intends to report has already
been allocated. We say strategy τ is well–defined with respect
5In [Kalinowski et al., 2013b], the allocation procedure applying
the sequential protocol, is viewed as a finite repeated game with per-
fect information, where all agents act strategically.
6In the environments where every agent can learn other agent’s
preferences in advance, centralized allocation methods need to be
taken into consideration instead. Because in these cases, the prereq-
uisite to the protection of private preferences is ruined.
to 〈≻2, . . . ,≻n〉 if at any stage t ∈ {1, . . . , T }, object o′t is
still available, and there is no object available after stage T .
A manipulation problem M (for agent 1) consists of 〈≻2
, . . . ,≻n〉, and a target set of objects S ⊆ O. A well-defined
strategy τ is successful for M if, assuming the agents 2 to
n act sincerely, τ ensures that agent 1 gets all objects in
S. Solving M consists in determining whether there exists
a successful strategy. Below we show that the manipula-
tion problem M can be solved in polynomial time. First,
we define some notions: for every i ∈ N , A,B ⊆ O s.t.
A ∩ B = ∅, BETTERi(A,B) = {o ∈ A|(∀o′ ∈ B)o ≻i o′},
and BESTi(A) = o ∈ A s.t. o ≻i o′ for every o′ ∈ A \ {o}.
We can get Lemma 2 directly.
Lemma 2 Let A ⊆ C ⊆ O, B ⊆ D ⊆ O, and C ∩D = ∅.
Then for any i ∈ N , BETTERi(A,D) ⊆ BETTERi(C,D) ⊆
BETTERi(C,B), and if BESTi(C) ∈ A then BESTi(C) =
BESTi(A), otherwise BESTi(C) ≻i BESTi(A).
Second, for a target set S ⊆ O, we construct a sequence
ρS = 〈O′1,S1,O1〉, 〈O
′
2,S2,O2〉, . . . as follows:
• O′1 = O, N
′ = {2, . . . , n};
• Sk =
⋃
i∈N ′ BETTERi(O
′
k ∩ S ,O
′
k \ S);
• Ok = {o ∈ O
′
k \ S|(∃i ∈ N
′)o = BESTi(O′k \ S)};
• O′k+1 = O
′
k \ (Sk ∪Ok).
Obviously, for every o ∈ O, there exists one and only k ≥ 1
s.t. o ∈ Sk ∪ Ok. We denote by appS(o) the number k.
Lemma 3 Let S ′ ⊆ S ⊆ O, ρS′ =
〈O′1,S1,O1〉, 〈O
′
2,S2,O2〉, . . ., and ρS =
〈O′′1 ,S
∗
1 ,O
∗
1〉, 〈O
′′
2 ,S
∗
2 ,O
∗
2〉, . . .. Then for every k ≥ 1
we have
⋃k
t≥1 St ⊆
⋃k
t≥1 S
∗
t and
⋃k
t≥1(St ∪ Ot) ⊆⋃k
t≥1(S
∗
t ∪ O
∗
t ).
PROOF. (Sketch) According to Lemma 2, we have S1 ⊆ S∗1 and
S1 ∪ O1 ⊆ S
∗
1 ∪ O
∗
1 . Now assume that
⋃k
t≥1 St ⊆
⋃k
t≥1 S
∗
t and
⋃k
t≥1(St∪Ot) ⊆
⋃k
t≥1(S
∗
t ∪O
∗
t ) for any k < p. Then O′p ⊇ O′′p .
Let N ′ = {2, . . . , n}.
1. According Lemma 2, Sp =
⋃
i∈N ′ BETTERi(O
′
p ∩ S
′,O′p \
S ′) ⊆
⋃
i∈N ′ BETTERi(O
′
p ∩ S ,O
′′
p \ S). Pick an object
o from Sp. If o ∈ O′′p ∩ S then there must be i ∈ N ′ s.t.
o ∈ BETTERi(O′′p ∩ S ,O′′p \ S), i.e., o ∈ S∗p . Otherwise
o ∈ (O′p \O
′′
p )∩S , i.e., there must be some q < p s.t. o ∈ S∗q .
So according to the assumption, we have
⋃p
t≥1 St ⊆
⋃p
t≥1 S
∗
t .
2. Pick an object o′ from Op. Then there exists i ∈ N ′ s.t. o′ =
BESTi(O′p \S ′). It is easy to find thatO′′p \S ⊆ O′p \S ′. So if
o′ ∈ O′′p \S then o′ = BESTi(O′′p \S), i.e., o′ ∈ O∗p . If o′ ∈ S
then there exists some q ≤ p s.t. o′ ∈ S∗q . Otherwise (i.e.,
o′ ∈ O′p \ (O
′′
p ∪ S)) there exists some q′ < p s.t. o′ ∈ O∗q′ .
According to items 1 and 2 and the assumption, we have
⋃p
t≥1 St ⊆⋃p
t≥1 S
∗
t and
⋃p
t≥1(St ∪Ot) ⊆
⋃p
t≥1(S
∗
t ∪O
∗
t ). 
Now we can give a simple characterization of successful
strategies in manipulation problems.
Theorem 1 Let M = 〈〈≻2, . . . ,≻n〉,S〉 be a manipulation
problem, and ρS = 〈O′′1 ,S∗1 ,O∗1〉, 〈O′′2 ,S∗2 ,O∗2〉, . . .. There
exists a successful strategy for M iff for any k ≥ 1 we have
k > |
⋃
1≤t≤k S
∗
t |. Moreover, in this case any strategy τ
starting by reporting the objects in S, and reporting o before
stage appS(o) for every o ∈ S, (and completed so as to be
well-defined) is successful.
PROOF. (Sketch) We prove the statement by induction on the
size of the target set S . In the case when S is a singleton {o}, it is
easy to find that |
⋃
1≤t≤k S
∗
t | ≤ |{o}| = 1 for every k ≥ 1. So
S∗1 = ∅ (i.e., appS(o) > 1) iff k > |
⋃
1≤t≤k S
∗
t | for any k ≥ 1. If
S∗1 = ∅ (i.e., no agent in {2, . . . , n} reports o at stage 1) then 1 can
get o by reporting o first. If S∗1 6= ∅ (i.e., there must be some agent
in {2, . . . , n} reporting o at stage 1) then there exists no successful
strategy for M .
Now assume that the statement holds for any target set whose size
is no more than p − 1. Consider a target set S = {o′1, . . . , o′p} s.t.
appS(o′1) ≤ . . . ≤ appS(o′p). Then k > |
⋃
1≤t≤k S
∗
t | for any
k ≥ 1 iff k > |
⋃
1≤t≤k S
∗
t | for any p ≥ k ≥ 1. Let S ′ = S \ {o′p}
and ρS′ = 〈O′1,S1,O1〉, 〈O′2,S2,O2〉, . . ..
• If k > |
⋃
1≤t≤k S
∗
t | for any p ≥ k ≥ 1 then:
1. appS(o′p) > |
⋃
1≤t≤app
S
(o′p)
S∗t | = p. So o′p 6∈
⋃p
t≥1(S
∗
t ∪ O
∗
t ). From Lemma 3, we have o′p 6∈⋃p
t≥1(St ∪ Ot) ⊆
⋃p
t≥1(S
∗
t ∪ O
∗
t ) and k >
|
⋃
1≤t≤k S
∗
t | ≥ |
⋃
1≤t≤k St| for any p ≥ k ≥ 1.
2. According to item 1 and the assumption, there exists a
successful strategy τ ′ for 〈〈≻2, . . . ,≻n〉,S ′〉 starting by
reporting the objects in S ′.
3. According to items 1 and 2, if at each stage k < p, 1
reports the object specified by τ ′, then o′p is available
and not reported by any i ∈ {2, . . . , n} at stage p. Let τ
be a well–defined strategy reporting the object specified
by τ ′ at any stage k < p, and reporting o′p at stage p. It
is easy to find that τ is successful for M .
• If there exists some p ≥ k ≥ 1 s.t. k ≤ |
⋃
1≤t≤k S
∗
t |,
then there must be some i ∈ {2, . . . , n} reporting some
o ∈
⋃
1≤t≤k S
∗
t at some stage k′ ≤ k. In this case, there
is no successful strategy for M .
So the statement holds for any target set whose size is p. 
We develop Algorithm 1 (in which the set of objects
O = {o1, . . . , om} and the set of agents N = {1, . . . , n} are
supposed to be global variables) to find successful strategies.
The soundness and and completeness of the algorithm
is from the proof of Theorem 1. It is not hard to find that
Algorithm 1 always terminates and is polynomial in m and n.
Algorithm 1: Finding a successful strategy τ for M
input: a manipulation problem M = 〈〈≻2, . . . ,≻n〉,S〉
output: a successful strategy τ for M if it exists,
otherwise failure;
1. O′ ← O, S ′ ← S , size← 0, τ ← ε, τ ′ ← ε,
N ′ ← {2, . . . , n}, k ← 1; /* Initialization */
2. while(O′ 6= ∅)
3. S∗ ←
⋃
i∈N ′ BETTERi(S
′,O′ \ S ′);
4. size← size+ |S∗|;
5. if size ≥ k then return failure;
6. for all o ∈ S∗
7. τ ← τ • o; /* • denotes connection*/
8. O∗ ← {o ∈ O′ \ S ′|(∃i ∈ N ′)o = BESTi(O′ \ S ′)};
9. if k > |S| and O∗ 6= ∅
10. randomly pick an object o from O∗;
11. τ ′ ← τ ′ • o; /*completed so as to be well–defined*/
12. O′ ← O′ \ (S∗ ∪ O∗), S ′ ← S ′ \ S∗, k ← k + 1;
13. return τ • τ ′;
We say a well-defined strategy τ is optimal (in the sense of
pessimism) if it maximizes 1’s benefit under the assumption
that 1 can not win any lottery. In fact, it is not hard to find
that if agent 1’s scoring function is gL then she can find an
optimal strategy (in the sense of pessimism) in polynomial
time by applying Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Finding an optimal strategy
input: a profile R = 〈≻1, . . . ,≻n〉
output: an optimal strategy τ in the sense of pessimism
1. O′ ← O, S ← ∅; /* Initialization */
2. τ ← Algorithm 1(〈≻2, . . . ,≻n〉, ∅);
3. while(O′ 6= ∅)
4. o← BEST1(O′), O′ ← O′ \ {o};
5. τ ′ ← Algorithm 1(〈≻2, . . . ,≻n〉,S ∪ {o});
6. if τ ′ 6= failure
7. τ ← τ ′,S ← S ∪ {o};
8. return τ ;
Let’s run Algorithm 2 on the profile R given in Exam-
ple 1. Then {o2}, i.e., the best set of objects that 1 can
manage to get is found, and a successful strategy for the set
(i.e, o2, o3 or o2, o5) is returned. We conjecture that under
the Borda scoring function gB, the problem of finding an
optimal strategy is NP-hard, but we do not have a proof.
6 Conclusion
We have defined and studied a parallel elicitation-free proto-
col for allocating indivisible goods. The protocol is param-
eterized by a parallel policy (i.e., an agent selection policy),
which can consider the allocation history that had happened.
We have compared a special parallel policy (i.e., ̟A) with
sequential policies for small numbers of objects and agents
with respect to the three social welfare criteria considered
in [Bouveret and Lang, 2011] and [Kalinowski et al., 2012].
The results show that ̟A outperforms the optimal sequential
policies in most cases. We have also proved that an agent
who knows the preferences of other agents can find in poly-
nomial time whether she has a successful strategy for a target
set; and that if the scoring function of the manipulator is gL,
she could compute an optimal strategy (in the sense of pes-
simism) in polynomial time.
There are several directions for future work. One direction
would be to prove the conjectures about the social welfare in-
duced by ̟A, and to design other parallel policies that can
outperform ̟A in some social welfare criterion. Another di-
rection would be to find the missing complexity results for
manipulation under gB, and to consider strategical issues un-
der the assumption that the manipulator believes any lottery is
fair. Furthermore, we plan to design an elicitation-free proto-
col for allocating sharable goods [Airiau and Endriss, 2010].
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